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SIMMONS V. GREENVILLE HOSPITAL:
AN UNUSUALLY STRINGENT RULE AGAINST
RETROACTiVE LEGISLATION
I. INTRODUCTION
The philosophical underpinnings of the American system of government are as
numerous as they are diverse. However, separation of powers between diverse
branches is undeniably one of the most important notions of government.
Montesquieu, whose theories of governance are apparent throughout our system,
emphasized this notion that "there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not
separated from the legislative and the executive."' This idea was so important to
the framers of the United States Constitution that in, 1789, James Madison proposed
a new article to the Constitution expressly separating the branches of government.2
The framers of the South Carolina Constitution felt that separation of powers
was so critical to the operation of the state government that they included a specific
clause.3 Article I, section 8 of the South Carolina Constitution states that "the
legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the government shall be forever
separate and distinct from each other, and no... departments shall assume or
discharge the duties of any other."4 Yet, just as the federal separation of powers
doctrine is enigmatic, as common law notions such as the political question doctrine
and the prohibition against advisory opinions illustrate, so too is South Carolina's.
South Carolina's constitutional text leaves a wide berth for courts to interpret what
violates its separation of powers provision.
In Simmons v. Greenville Hospital System,5 the South Carolina Supreme Court
recently added some meaning to that very clause with respect to the division
between the legislature and the judiciary. In Simmons, the court delivered the final
jurisprudence in a long line of cases that created a framework for examining certain
retroactive legislation for compliance with South Carolina's constitutional
separation of powers mandate.6 The Simmons court held that the separation of
powers clause prevents South Carolina's General Assembly from acting
retroactively in the face of a judicial decision, and that any legislation attempting
to do so is ineffective for any cause of action accruing prior to the legislation's
passage.7
This Note examines the importance of Simmons and its predecessors in
expanding the power of the South Carolina judiciary. Part II examines the
precedent leading up to Simmons and the impact of the court's decision on
1. Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1513, 1535
(1991) (quoting CHARLEs MoNTEsQuIEu, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 151 (T. Nugent trans., 1949)).
2. Id. at 1539. The text of the proposed article read:
The powers delegated by this constitution, are appropriated to the departments to
which they are respectively distributed: so that the legislative department shall
never exercise the powers vested in the executive or judicial; nor the executive
exercise the powers vested in the legislative or judicial; nor the judicial exercise
the powers vested in the legislative or executive departments.
Id. (quoting 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 202 (C. Hobson & R. Rutland eds., 1979)).
3. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 8.
4. Id.
5. 355 S.C. 581, 586 S.E.2d 569 (2003).
6. Id. at 587-88, 586 S.E.2d at 572.
7. Id. at 588, 586 S.E.2d at 572.
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separation of powers jurisprudence in South Carolina. Part III compares South
Carolina's separation of powers law to that of other states and the federal
government and focuses on South Carolina's position among the varying
applications of the separation of powers doctrine in the context of retroactive
legislation. Finally, Part IV critiques the precedent leading up to Simmons and
concludes that, although the legal path leading to Simmons was questionable, its end
fully justifies the means.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Separation of Powers Becomes a Weapon for the Judiciary
In Lindsay v. National Old Line Insurance Co.,' the South Carolina Supreme
Court used some choice language by' a trial court judge to commence a new line of
separation of powers jurisprudence. The National OldLine court ruled on a rather
mundane issue: whether two statutes purporting to charge fees to foreign insurance
companies doing business in South Carolina could coexist."0  The first
statute-known as the "Retaliatory Statute"'--charged a reciprocal fee differential
to foreign insurers doing business in South Carolina to equalize the fees South
Carolina's insurers paid when insuring businesses in foreign jurisdictions.' 2 The
second statute provided for a credit against the reciprocal fee differential for
insurers making certain qualified investments in South Carolina. 3 Previously, in
Lindsay v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co.,'4 the South Carolina
Supreme Court addressed the conflict between these laws by holding that the
General Assembly intended the Retaliatory Statute to apply even where an
insurance company was making qualified investments in the state.'5 Southern Farm
Bureau effectively eviscerated the statutory credits for any foreign insurance
companies whose home states charged higher fees for South Carolina insurers doing
business in their state.
The General Assembly disagreed with the court's interpretation of its legislative
intent and amended the Retaliatory Statute to state that "'all license fees and charges
made pursuant to this section shall be reduced to the extent of investment credits
granted by [the qualified investment sections].""' It provided further that "'[t]his
enactment is declared to be declaratory of the existing provisions of Section 37-
132.""' This "declaratory" language, in the thinking of the General Assembly,
made the investment credits retroactive to the initial passage of the Retaliatory
Statute.
Following the amendment, John Lindsay, Insurance Commissioner for South
Carolina, brought a declaratory judgment action against National Old Line
Insurance Co. (National Old Line), an Arkansas insurance carrier, to decide whether
8. 262 S.C. 621, 207 S.E.2d 75 (1974).
9. Id. at 628, 207 S.E.2d at 77-78.
10. Id. at 624, 207 S.E.2d at 75-76.
11. Id. at 625, 207 S.E.2d at 76.
12. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-132 (Michie 1962) (current version at S.C. CODEANN. § 38-7-90 (West
2002)).
13. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-123 (Michie 1962).
14. 258 S.C. 272, 188 S.E.2d 374 (1972) (per curiam).
15. Id. at 281, 188 S.E.2d at 378.
16. Lindsay v. Nat'l Old Line Ins. Co., 262 S.C. 621,628,207 S.E.2d 75,77 (1974); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 37-132 (current version at S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-7-90 (West 2002)).
17. Nat 'I Old Line Ins. Co., 262 S.C. at 628, 207 S.E.2d at 77.
[Vol. 56: 707
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the amended statute allowed the insurance company to collect investment credits
against fees paid prior to the amendment.' National Old Line sought these credits
despite Arkansas' higher license fees charged against foreign insurers.
19
In holding that National Old Line could not receive credit for fees paid prior to
the amendment,2" the trial court judge2 stated:
"[T]he provision in the 1972 amendment that it is 'declared to be
declaratory of the existing provisions of Section 37-132' is a
legislative attempt to reverse a decision of the Supreme Court. In
effect, the General Assembly has said as to Lindsay vs. Southern
Farm Bureau... 'We reverse.' Under our State Constitution
which provides... for the separation of the legislative, executive
and judicial powers of the government, the General Assembly
does not have authority to do this. Consequently, the 1972
amendment is to be given prospective effect only."'
A majority of the South Carolina Su reme Court agreed with the lower court's
reasoning and affirmed its decision.23 Thus, the court created the notion that, in
South Carolina, separation of powers prevents the General Assembly from enacting
a statute that operates retroactively in the face of a supreme court decision.
In dissent, Justice Brailsford questioned the applicability of the separation of
powers clause to retroactive legislation.2 In his opinion, Brailsford wrote:
The sole question is whether the amendment shall control the
calculation of the insurance company's license tax for years prior
to its adoption. The language of the amendment... leaves no
doubt that the legislature intended an affirmative answer to this
question. I would give effect to the declaratory language as
manifesting the intention of the legislature that the amendment
should operate retrospectively and calculate the license tax
accordingly.25
Justice Brailsford believed that the legislative intent should control, such that, if the
General Assembly intended its new law to operate retroactively, then that intention
should prevail.26
B. The South Carolina Tort Claims Act: Expansion of the Doctrine
For twenty-five years, the National Old Line decision remained dormant in
South Carolina's jurisprudence. However, the General Assembly set the
machinery of change in motion in 1986 by enacting the South Carolina Tort Claims
18. Id. at 624, 207 S.E.2d at 76.
19. Id. at 625, 207 S.E.2d at 76.
20. Id. at 626, 207 S.E.2d at 76-77.
21. Judge A. Spruill, Jr.
22. Nat l Old Line Ins. Co., 262 S.C. at 628, 207 S.E.2d at 77-78.
23. Lindsay v. Nat'l Old Line Ins. Co., 262 S.C. 621, 629, 207 S.E.2d 75, 78 (1974).
24. Id. at 630, 207 S.E.2d at 78 (Brailsford, J., dissenting).
25. Id. (emphasis added).
26. Id.
27. See Steinke v. S.C. Dep't of Labor, 336 S.C. 373,402-03,520 S.E.2d 142, 157 (1999) (citing
Nat I Old Line for the first time since the original ruling).
2005]
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Act (SCTCA),28 which capped tort claims against the state at $250,000.29 Two
years later, in 1988, the General Assembly passed the Uniform Contribution Among30
Tortfeasors Act (UCTA), which creates a right of contribution for any jointly
liable tortfeasor who pays more than his or her pro rata share of the joint liability.
In Southeastern Freight Lines v. City ofHartsville,32 these two laws came into
conflict. The plaintiff died when a Southeastern Freight Lines Truck collided with
her vehicle inside Hartsville city limits at an intersection not marked with proper
warnings.33 Southeastern Freight Lines settled the claim with the plaintiff for
$400,000 and sought contribution from the city and state for $266,667, theirpro rata
shares pursuant to the UCTA.34 The City of Hartsville and South Carolina
contested contribution on the grounds that "the total- liability of the government
entities in this case [can] not exceed $250,000" under the UCTA.35
The supreme court held that the conflict between the SCTCA and the UCTA
was "incapable of reasonable reconcilement," and that one law had to give way to
the other."- To determine which statute should control, the court held that the most
recent statute-the UCTA--impliedly repealed the offending portions of the older
statute-the SCTCA.37 In so holding, Southeastern Freight Lines established that
the General Assembly's passage of the UCTA repealed the statutory caps that the
SCTCA defined.38 Notably, that ruling nullified the offending provisions of the
SCTCA in their entirety, not merely with respect to claims involving joint
tortfeasors.39
The General Assembly did not agree with the South Carolina Supreme Court's
view that it intended for the UCTA to repeal the statutory caps in the SCTCA.' On
July 1, 1994, a mere two months after the ruling in Southeastern Freight Lines, the
General Assembly amended the Tort Claims Act.4 The amendment stated that the
governmental statutory caps "are reenacted and made retroactive to... the effective
date of the South Carolina Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, except for causes
of action that have been filed in a court of competent jurisdiction before July 1,
1994. "42
The South Carolina Supreme Court subsequently reviewed the General
Assembly's retroactive amendment of the SCTCA in Steinke v. South Carolina
Department ofLabor, Licensing & Regulation.43 Steinke died in a bungee jumping
accident when the cables supporting the elevator carrying him to the jumping height
28. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-78-120-15-78-200 (West Supp. 2003).
29. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-120(a)(1) (West Supp. 2003) (amended in 1997, increasing the cap
to $300,000).
30. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-38-10-15-38-70 (West Supp. 2003).
31. S.C. CODE ANN.§ 15-38-20(A) (West Supp. 2003).
32. 313 S.C. 466, 443 S.E.2d 395 (1994).
33. Id. at 468, 443 S.E.2d at 396.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 469, 443 S.E.2d at 397.
37. Id. (citing Chris J. Yahnis Coastal, Inc. v. Stroh Brewery Co., 295 S.C. 243, 368 S.E.2d 64
(1988)).
38. Southeastern Freight Lines v. City of Hartsville, 313 S.C. 466, 469, 443 S.E.2d 395, 397
(1994).
39. See id.
40. See Steinke v. S.C. Dep't of Labor, 336 S.C. 373, 402, 520 S.E.2d 142, 157 (1999) (citing
Appropriation Act of 1994, 1994 S.C. Acts 5129, 5793).
41. Appropriation Act of 1994, 1994 S.C. Acts 5129, 5793.
42. Id. (emphasis added).
43. 336 S.C. 373, 520 S.E.2d 142 (1999).
(Vol. 56: 707
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snapped and sent him 160 feet to his death." Steinke's estate's suit against the
South Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation (the Department)
alleged that it negligently failed to revoke the license of the bungee jumping
operation when it was aware that the elevator was unsafe.4" At trial, the jury
awarded the plaintiff $900,000 in damages." On appeal, the Department raised a
number of defenses to liability, including the SCTCA's statutory caps.47
In Steinke, the supreme court reiterated that Southeastern Freight Lines
rendered the SCTCA caps meaningless because of the conflict with the UCTA.
48
The court noted further that the General Assembly's 1994 amendment explicitly did
not apply to causes of action filed prior to July 1, 1994.49 In conclusion, the court
determined that, because Steinke filed the original complaint on June 29, 1994, the
amendment's express reinstatement provision was inapplicable."0
The court could have ended its discussion there without affecting the result of
the case. However, the court added that "[t]his issue implicates the doctrine of
separation of powers,"' and cited National OldLine as precedent for the notion that
"'a judicial [interpretation] of a statute is determinative of its meaning and effect,
and any subsequent legislative amendment to the contrary will only be effective
from the date of its enactment and cannot be applied retroactively."' 2
The court held that "this case, filed before the Legislature reinstated the
statutory caps, is controlled by the principles outlined in Lindsay [v. National Old
Line] . . . . The Legislature may not retroactively overrule this Court's
interpretation of the statutes in Southeastern Freight Lines."s3 Consequently, the
General Assembly's 1994 amendment to the SCTCA could not operate
retroactively.' The court did state, however, that the General Assembly was free
to reinstate the statutory caps in future cases, but the court did not specify what
constitutes a future case. 5 This question-what constitutes a future case-left open
the issue that created the current state of South Carolina law.
In Simmons v. Greenville Hospital System,56 the South Carolina Supreme Court
heard a case with facts allowing it to solidify the jurisprudence it began with in
National Old Line and expanded in Steinke. In Simmons, the plaintiff's child,
Chavis Simmons, contracted a dangerous infection while in the Neonatal Intensive
Care Unit at Greenville Memorial Hospital in late April 1992. 57 Chavis suffered
permanent brain damage as a result of the infection.5
Chavis' parents filed suit against the hospital on his behalf on May 8, 1998,
alleging negligence on the part of the hospital.59 The hospital settled the suit for
$1,500,000, but paid out only $250,000 based on its belief that the SCTCA statutory
44. Id. at 382, 520 S.E.2d at 146-47.
45. Id. at 384,520 S.E.2d at 147.
46. Id. at 382, 520 S.E.2d at 146.
47. Id. at 401, 520 S.E.2d at 156.
48. Id. at 402, 520 S.E.2d at 157.
49. Steinke v. S.C. Dep't of Labor, 336 S.C. 373, 402, 520 S.E.2d 142, 157 (1999).
50. Id. at 403, 520 S.E.2d at 157.
51. Id. at 402, 520 S.E.2d at 157.
52. Id. at 402-03, 520 S.E.2d at 157 (citing Lindsay v. National Old Line Ins. Co., 262 S.C. 621,
628-29, 207 S.E.2d 75, 78 (1974)) (alteration in original).
53. Id. at 403, 520 S.E.2d at 157-58.
54. See id.
55. Steinke v. S.C. Dep't of Labor, 336 S.C. 373, 403, 520 S.E.2d 142, 158 (1999).
56. 355 S.C. 581, 586 S.E.2d 569 (2003).
57. Id. at 583, 586 S.E.2d at 569-70.
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caps limited any recovery.' The Chavis family subsequently sought a declaratory
judgment that the SCTCA did not so limit the hospital's liability. At trial, the court
found for the hospital and limited the plaintiff's recovery to $250,000.61
On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court faced the question of whether the
SCTCA's statutory cap, which the General Assembly amended in 1994 and 1997,
applied to Simmons' claims.62 Under Steinke, the statutory caps only applied to
"future cases" with respect to the 1994 amendment to the SCTCA.63 The Simmons
court faced the challenge of determining whether the liability caps applied to a
cause of action that accrued before passage of the amendment, but which the
plaintiff filed after the amendment's effective date."
The Simmons court again cited National OldLine and the separation of powers
doctrine for the proposition that legislation cannot operate retroactively in the face
of a final judicial decision.6" The court noted that:
At the time [the] claim arose-when Chavis was infected shortly
after his birth in 1992-there were no statutory caps in place
under the rule of Southeastern. Therefore, the Legislature's
attempt to reach back and change the status of such claims that
arose prior to the Legislature's 1994 reinstatement of the liability
caps ... is, by definition, retroactive, and violates the doctrine of
separation of powers."
Thus, the Simmons court articulated what is now the rule regarding separation of
powers in South Carolina. The General Assembly has the power to enact statutes
retroactively. When the Supreme Court has invalidated a statute, however, the
General Assembly may only reenact the law such that it operates prospectively.
Any such statute that operates on a cause of action accruing prior to the date on
which the General Assembly reenacts the statute violates the separation of powers
doctrine and is ineffective for those causes of action.67
1m. ANALYSIS: THE SEPARATION OF POWERS SPECTRUM
This Part analyzes South Carolina's approach to constitutional jurisprudence
by placing it on a continuum of the effect the separation of powers doctrine has on
retroactive legislation in other United States jurisdictions. On the permissive end
of the continuum are governments that allow retroactive legislation in any situation.
Conversely, on the restrictive end of the spectrum are governments that allow no
retroactive legislation whatsoever. In the United States, the federal government is
close to the permissive end, while South Carolina occupies a position close to the
restrictive end of the spectrum.
60. Id. at 583-84, 586 S.E.2d at 570.
61. Id. at 584, 586 S.E.2d at 570.
62. Simmons v. Greenville Hosp. Sys., 355 S.C. 581, 584, 586 S.E.2d 569, 570 (2003).
63. Steinke v. S.C. Dep't of Labor, 336 S.C. 373, 403, 520 S.E.2d 142, 158 (1999).
64. Simmons, 355 S.C. at 587, 586 S.E.2d at 572 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 586, 586 S.E.2d at 571.




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 4 [], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol56/iss4/7
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Simmons Compared to Federal Jurisprudence
In ruling that the General Assembly cannot retroactively amend a statute that
the judicial branch has invalidated, the Simmons court framed separation of powers
jurisprudence very different from the federal system.68 The United States
Constitution does not have an express separation of powers clause69 like the South
Carolina Constitution does, but our federal government has long recognized the
doctrine.
70
In the very narrow area of retroactive legislation, Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm is
the seminal United States Supreme Court case.7' Prior to Plaut, the Supreme Court
held that a special statute of limitations existed for violations of securities law that,
in most cases, was shorter than the applicable jurisdictional limitation.72 That rule
resulted in the lower federal courts dismissing a number of cases under the
securities law statute of limitations that would otherwise have gone forward."
Congress, however, did not like the Court's interpretation of the statute of
limitations and amended the law to extend the federal limitation.74 As part of the
amendment, Congress sought to reinstate cases that were "dismissed as time
barred... and... which would have been timely filed under the limitation period
provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction. " In this instance, the Court
struck down the amendment and held that "[b]y retroactively commanding the
federal courts to reopenfinaljudgments, Congress has violated [the] fundamental
principle" of separation of powers.76
The Court also stated, however, that "[w]hen a new law makes clear that it is
retroactive, an appellate court must apply [it] in reviewing judgments still on
appeal... and must alter the outcome accordingly., 77 Thus, in a federal court, as
long as Congress makes clear its intent that a law act retroactively, the law will
affect accrued, filed, and even decided causes of action, provided that the time limit
for thefinal appeal has not yet expired.78 This approach lies in stark contrast to that
68. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995) provides an illustration of the federal
approach. There, the Supreme Court noted:
Congress can always revise thejudgments of Article Ill courts in one sense: When
a new law makes clear that it is retroactive, an appellate court must apply that law
in reviewing judgments still on appeal that were rendered before the law was
enacted, and must alter the outcome accordingly.
Id. at 226.
69. Keith Werhan, Normalizing the Separation of Powers, 70 TUL L. REV. 2681, 2682 (1996).
In fact, the framers of the United States Constitution rejected any explicit separation of powers clause.
Brown, supra note 1, at 1531.
70. Seesupra notes 3-4 and accompanying text. See, e.g., PHILIPB.KuRLAND&RALPHLERNER,
THE FouNDERs' CONSTITUTION 312 (Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (noting that separation of power
concerns motivated the early constitutional debates of such early American icons as John Adams, James
Madison, and Thomas Jefferson).
71. 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
72. Id. at 213-14.
73. Id. at 214.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 215 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-I (Supp. V 1988)).
76. Id. at 219 (emphasis added).
77. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211,226 (1995).
78. Id. (emphasis added). The only other federal limitation on retroactive legislation is that it
must comport with due process. United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 30-31 (1994) (stating that only
rational basis review applies to due process challenges to retroactive legislation) (citing Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717,733 (1984)); see also Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511
U.S. 244, 266 (1994) ("The Due Process Clause also protects the interests in fair notice and repose that
may be compromised by retroactive legislation.") (citing Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S.
2005]
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of South Carolina and illustrates that the federal courts fall very close to the
permissive end of the separation of powers spectrum.
B. South Carolina in Comparison to Other States
Though the separation of powers model that Simmons articulated differs
materially from the federal model, South Carolina is not alone at the restrictive end
of the spectrum. Some states ban retrospective laws, which "are generally defined
as laws which 'take away or impair rights acquired under existing laws, or create
a new obligation, impose a new duty, or attach a new disability in respect to
transactions or considerations already passed."'7 9 These states emulate South
Carolina and fall toward the restrictive end of the continuum.
Some states, however, do allow retroactive legislation. Montana, for instance,
allows retroactive legislation so long as the legislature expressly declares the statute
to be retroactive. 0" In Michigan, "it is undisputed ... that the Legislature can
validate retroactively anything that it could have originally authorized."" These
states fall in line with the permissive federal model.
1. Georgia, Illinois, and Washington
Georgia provided the primary precedent on which the South Carolina Supreme
Court relied in rendering the National Old Line decision: 2 McCutcheon v. Smith.S3
In that case, the Georgia Supreme Court revisited its previous ruling that, under the
Georgia Civil Service Act of 1943, plaintiff McCutcheon was not an employee of
Fulton County." On February 8, 1945, the Georgia Legislature amended the act in
question to state that "as of June 1, 1943, Mrs. Evelyn W. McCutcheon was an
employee of Fulton County... and that she occupied the position of matron of the
Fulton County jail.""5
The Georgia Supreme Court held that the Georgia Legislature's retroactive
attempt to change the judicial interpretation of a statute "offends the [separation of
powers] clause of the [Georgia] Constitution... and is void."'86
The primary basis for the McCutcheon v. Smith decision was a previous
Georgia decision, Wilder v. Lumpkin.87 The Wilder court stated that, when a "law
is the exercise of a judicial power, and.., it interferes with no vested right, [and]
impairs the obligation of no contract," then it "may be admitted to retroactive
efficiency." '88 In combination, these cases show that Georgia is concerned with
retroactive legislation only in the instance where that legislation in some way
impinges on a vested right. Although this interpretation places Georgia on the
1,17 (1976)).
79. Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 862 S.W.2d 338,340 (Mo. 1993) (en banc) (quoting Lucas
v. Murphy, 156 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Mo. 1941)). Some state constitutions expressly provide this ban.
See, e.g., MO. CONST art. I, § 13 (noting that "no ... law.. retrospective in its operation... can be
enacted").
80. MONT. CODEANN. § 1-2-109 (2003).
81. Armco Steel Corp. v. Dept. of Treasury, 358 N.W.2d 839, 844 (Mich. 1984).
82. Lindsay v. Nat'l Old Line Ins. Co., 262 S.C. 621, 629, 207 S.E.2d 75, 78 (1974).
83. 35 S.E.2d 144 (Ga. 1945).
84. See McCutcheon v. MacNeil, 28 S.E.2d 469, 471 (Ga. 1943).
85. Smith, 35 S.E.2d at 148.
86. Id. at 148-49.
87. 4 Ga. 208 (1848).
88. Id. at 212 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 56: 707
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restrictive end of the spectrum, its separation of powers doctrine is less restrictive
than South Carolina's.
Illinois jurisprudence, which the Steinke court cited in support of its decision,89
also treats retroactive legislation much like South Carolina. In Roth v. Yackley,90
the Illinois Supreme Court held that precedent "do[es] not recognize that the
[Illinois] General Assembly may retroactively overrule a decision of a reviewing
court." ' However, more recently, the Illinois Supreme Court clarified this holding
by stating that "[Roth]... [is] not contrary to [the] ... principle that the General
Assembly may enact retroactive legislation which changes the effect of a prior
decision of a reviewing court with respect to cases which have not been finally
decided."2 Thus, while Illinois may have held to the doctrine that its General
Assembly could not act retroactively over a court decision, its supreme court now
applies the separation of powers doctrine like the federal courts.
The Steinke court also cited a Washington case in support of its separation of
powers holding.93 In the cited opinion, the Washington court noted that "legislative
clarifications, as opposed to amendments, are generally retroactive and effective
from the original date of the statute."'94 However, when the clarifying statute exists
"to correct a judicial interpretation of a prior law ... the effect is prospective only.
Any other result would make the legislature a court of last resort."' Therefore,
Washington's approach falls close to the restrictive end of the spectrum.
2. Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania's separation of powers jurisprudence is similar to South
Carolina's post-Simmons rule and may be instructive on the future impact of the
decision. In Pennsylvania, the "'state constitution [does not] invalidate[] a non-
penal statute merely because it is retroactive. "' However, Pennsylvania also holds
that "'[r]etrospective laws may be supported when they do not disturb any vested
right, but only vary remedies, cure defects in proceedings otherwise fair, and do not
vary existing obligations contrary to their situation when entered into and when
prosecuted."'9 In this context, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court expressly noted
that "[tihere is a vested right in an accrued cause of action. '" s Therefore, in
Pennsylvania, the legislature may act retroactively. However, its retroactive
legislation cannot apply to causes of action that accrued prior to the passage of the
act.99 This test is substantially similar to the South Carolina approach.
Interestingly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that its view "is consistent
with federal decisional law which squarely holds that a legislature may not
constitutionally eliminate in toto a remedy, whether judicially or legislatively
89. Steinke v. S.C. Dep't of Labor, 336 S.C. 373, 403 n.i 1, 520 S.E.2d 142, 157 n.I (1999).
90. 396 N.E.2d 520 (111. 1979).
91. Id. at 522.
92. Sanelli v. Glenview State Bank, 483 N.E.2d 226, 231 (111. 1985). Notably, the decision in
this case predated Steinke in South Carolina by fourteen years.
93. Steinke, 336 S.C. at403 n.11, 520 S.E.2d at 157 n.11.
94. Marine Power & Equip. Co. v. Wash. State Human Rights Comm'n, 694 P.2d 697, 700
(Wash. CL App. 1985) (citing Johnson v. Morris, 557 P.2d 1299 (Wash. 1976)).
95. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION,
§ 27.04, at 313 (4th ed. 1973)).
96. Jenkins v. Hosp. of the Med. Coll., 634 A.2d 1099, 1104 (Pa. 1993) (quoting Banasch v. Pa.
Publ. Util. Comm'n, 532 A.2d 325, 337 (Pa. 1987), aff'd, 488 U.S. 299 (1989)).
97. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Smith v. Fenner, 161 A.2d 150, 154 (Pa. 1960)).
98. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Gibson v. Commonwealth, 415 A.2d 80, 83 (Pa. 1980)).
99. Id. at 1105.
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created which has already accrued."' ° Despite Pennsylvania's declaration of
federal congruence, federal courts have directly questioned its jurisprudence as
contrary to federal constitutional precedent.'' In In re TM, the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals stated the Plaut rule that "federal constitutional precedent... finds no
vested right in a tort cause of action before finaljudgment."" Further, "[t]hese
cases [that] treat an accrued tort cause of action as a 'vested right' under the United
States Constitution . . . are contrary to current . . .precedent."' 03 Given
Pennsylvania's apparent interest in following accepted federal standards and the
Third Circuit's opinion that it currently fails to do so, Pennsylvania may shift to the
more permissive end of the spectrum.
South Carolina occupies a position on the restrictive end of the separation of
powers spectrum close to that of Pennsylvania. Like Pennsylvania, South Carolina
is at least impliedly following the "vested right" doctrine. Simmons and its
predecessors expressly follow Georgia's precedent, °4 which, dating back to 1848,
has been concerned with the legislative trampling of a vested right. " Further, the
Simmons rule appears to follow Pennsylvania's Jenkins rule, which states that
vesting occurs when the cause of action accrues, not at some other moment, such
as the time when the right of final appeal expires."
Because of its similarity with Pennsylvania, South Carolina's doctrine
regarding retroactive legislation is subject to the same criticism that the Third
Circuit levied against Pennsylvania.
IV. ANALYSIS: QUESTIONABLE MEANS TO A WORTHWHILE END
A. Weak Links in the Chain of Precedent
While courts frequently change their jurisprudence over time, Simmons is a
significant departure from previous South Carolina decisions implicating retroactive
legislation and the separation of powers doctrine.0 7 Two distinct problems arise
from Simmons that will trouble anyone analyzing or applying its holding. First, the
holding in National Old Line may not provide sufficient grounds to make the legal
leap the South Carolina Supreme Court took in Steinke. Second, the rule
promulgated by the South Carolina Supreme Court in Steinke was arguably dicta,
a fact that the Simmons court should have acknowledged before significantly
changing South Carolina's constitutional law.
South Carolina's evolution from National Old Line to Steinke marked a
material shift from the permissive to the restrictive end of the separation of powers
spectrum. Examination of the National Old Line decision indicates that it was
consistent with Plaut-like federal jurisprudence regarding retroactive legislation.
Under the rule in Georgia-which National Old Line cited as precedent--"' [a]
100. Id. (quoting Gibson, 415 A.2d at 83).
101. See In re TMI, 89 F.3d 1106, 1115 (3d Cir. 1996).
102. Id. at 1115 n.9 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
103. Id. (citations omitted).
104. See, e.g., Lindsay v. Nat'l Old Line Ins. Co., 262 S.C. 621,629, 207 S.E.2d 75, 78 (1974)
(citing Georgia law to support ban on retroactive legislation).
105. Wilder v. Lumpkin, 4 Ga. 208, 212 (1848).
106. Simmons v. Greenville Hosp. Sys., 355 S.C. 581, 587-88, 586 S.E.2d 569, 572 (2003).
107. See, e.g., Hyder v. Jones, 271 S.C. 85, 88, 245 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1978) (holding that the
South Carolina General Assembly may indicate a statute is to apply retroactively through clear intent);
State v. McLeod, 270 S.C. 557, 560, 243 S.E.2d 446, 448 (1978) (noting that the "General Assembly
ordinarily has the authority to direct that an act operate retroactively").
[Vol. 56: 707
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legislative exposition of a doubtful law is the exercise of a judicial power, and if it
interferes with no vested rights, [and] impairs the obligation of no contract... it is
in itselfharmless, and maybe admitted to retroactive efficiency.""'908 Further, taking
McCutcheon v. Smith on its facts, the case itself is actually more like Plaut than
Simmons. InMcCutcheon v. Smith, the Georgia Legislature acted to overturn a final
decision by the Georgia Supreme Court regarding a single instance, rather than
retroactively overturning a law for all causes of action that vested before the
General Assembly could act."° Thus, McCutcheon v. Smith involved overturning
a final decision, which is not acceptable even under the permissive federal rule.
National OldLine's factual and procedural posture was substantially similar to
that inserted inMcCutcheon v. Smith."' Consequently, here again, any retroactive
application would violate even the permissive separation of powers rule in Plaut."
Thus, the National Old Line decision represented a very weak foundation for the
restrictive application of the separation of powers doctrine which followed it in
Steinke and Simmons.
Beyond those concerns, using Steinke as precedent for Simmons may be the
portion of the opinion most vulnerable to criticism. The Simmons court cited
Steinke as authority that the General Assembly may not act retroactively to affect
casesfiled before the law is effective. " Steinke's weight as precedent on this point
is subject to scrutiny, because the Steinke court did not need to reach the issue of
whether or not the statute in question could operate retroactively to adequately
resolve the case.
In Steinke, under the plain language of the challenged statute, any cause of
action "filed in a court of competent jurisdiction before July 1, 1994" was not
subject to the new rule." 3 The plaintiff filed the claims in Steinke on June 29, 1994
and, therefore, under the express language of the statute, the claims were not subject
to the new law." 4 Consequently, the court did not need to proceed on the question
of whether the statutory caps applied.
Under these circumstances, the holding in Steinke that the General Assembly
cannot make retroactive laws was arguably dicta. Certainly this instance would not
be the first time dicta from a prior opinion evolved into a rule in a subsequent case.
However, given the constitutional import of the decision, the fact that the ground
on which Simmons stands is not as solid as the court tacitly implies is especially
noteworthy.
B. While Legally Questionable, Simmons Is Still Good for South Carolina
Many commentators consider the separation of the powers of governance into
three branches to be the cornerstone of the United States Constitution and the
108. McCutcheon v. Smith, 35 S.E.2d 144, 148 (Ga. 1945) (quoting Wilder v. Lumpkin, 4 Ga.
208, 212 (1848)).
109. Id.
110. Lindsay v. Nat'l Old Line Ins. Co., 262 S.C. 621,626, 207 S.E.2d 75, 76 (1974).
111. See also Sanelli v. Glenview State Bank, 483 N.E.2d 226, 231-32 (11. 1985) (defining a
Plaut-like rule and distinguishing a prior case in which a legislative act overturning a fine already paid
was a violation of separation of powers). The illinois Supreme Court explained: "Roth was an attempt
to recover fines and costs that had been paid in cases which had been finally adjudicated." Id.
112. Simmons v. Greenville Hosp. Sys., 355 S.C. 581, 587, 586 S.E.2d 569, 572 (2003)
(emphasis added).
113. Steinke v. S.C. Dep't of Labor, 336 S.C. 373, 402, 520 S.E.2d 142, 157 (1999) (quoting
Appropriation Act of 1994, 1994 S.C. Acts 5129, 5793).
114. Id. at 403, 520 S.E.2d at 157.
2005]
11
Miller: Simmons v. Greenville Hospital: An Unusually Stringent Rule Again
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
fulcrum upon which our personal liberties rest: 5 "Men's minds cannot be at rest
if two or three of the kinds of governmental power are held in the same hands."
''" 6
Separating governmental functions into the three branches protects the governed
against "arbitrary, tyrannical rule.""'
In Simmons, the South Carolina Supreme Court sought to protect these notions.
While the mechanism the court used may have been unorthodox, the result is a
positive move for the state in two major respects: (1) the rule furthers the federal
interest by experimenting with new political theories, and (2) the rule helps to even
the balance of power between the branches of the South Carolina government by
creating more independence for the judiciary.
1. Simmons Represents Heroic Experimentation
The holdings in Plaut and Simmons resided distinguishably at opposite ends of
the separation of powers spectrum."' However, no constitutional requirement
mandates that states' separation of powers jurisprudence mirror that of the federal
courts. To the contrary, the Constitution provides that "[tihe United States shall
guarantee to every State... a Republican Form of Government."" 9 The Supreme
Court has refrained from attempting to define or limit the scope of this provision,
usually on the grounds that adjudicating such a case would be a political question
and therefore not justiciable.'
Commentators suggest that this approach encourages states to be incubators for
new political ideas.' Simmons, in going against well-established federal
jurisprudence, is arguably one such experiment. However, as Justice Brandeis aptly
stated:
This Court has the power to prevent... experiment[ation]. We may strike
down the [law] which embodies it on the ground that, in our opinion, the
measure is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. We have power to do this,
because the due process clause has been held by the Court applicable to
matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure. But in the
exercise of this high power, we must be ever on our guard, lest we erect
our prejudices into legal principles.
2
Under these federal principles, South Carolina remains free to continue its"novel ... experiment[] without risk to the rest of the country"'23 and without
federal interference. In deviating from the federal examples, South Carolina and
other states with similar jurisprudence would continue to "serve as [a] laborator[y]
115. See PHUlP B. KURLAND& RALPH LERNER, THE FOUNDERs' CONSTITUTION 312 (Univ. of
Chi. Press 2000).
116. Id. (paraphrasing MONTESQUIEU, supra note 1, at 151).
117. Id.
118. Simmons v. Greenville Hosp. Sys., 355 S.C. 581,587-88,586 S.E.2d 569, 572 (2003).
119. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
120. See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 228-29 (1962) (holding that claims resting on
the Guaranty Clause are not justiciable because "they touch matters of state governmental
organization").
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for the development of new social, economic, and political ideas." '124 To do so may
draw continued attention to South Carolina's perceived unwillingness to conform
with a more national model.'25 However, differing and unusual jurisprudence
between state and federal governments is exactly what the federal system of
government envisions. '
2. Simmons Helps to Even the Balance of Power in South Carolina
Traditionally, South Carolina's General Assembly is the most powerful branch
of the state government. 27 A primary reason for this power is that the General
Assembly has sole control over the selection of supreme court justices,
2
1 court of
appeals judges,'29 and circuit court judges. 3° In contrast, the vast majority of states
allow for popular election of state court judges at some level.'
In addition, the legislative dominance over the judiciary arises from the fact
that, traditionally, the General Assembly has near total control over the budget in
South Carolina. A court simply cannot function properly without the requisite
funding to manage its workload. 33  As one prominent jurist noted, "The
legislature's control over the provision of financial resources to the judiciary
prevents the judiciary from being completely independent from the rest of the
government."'34 While at first glance this criticism appears purely academic,
evidence shows that budgetary control does affect the thought process of judges.
One judge noted in a judicial roundtable, "I have actually had a judge say to me:
'Why not take that phrase out of your opinion, you do not need it, and it might
offend the Senate. And you know how that could affect the judicial budget."""
The South Carolina General Assembly's willingness, albeit dated, to invoke its
constitutional power to eliminate the court of appeals when it disapproves of a
ruling further encouragesjudicial deference.' 36 The most famous example occurred
in the aftermath ofM 'Cready v. Hunt. 37 During restoration, South Carolina passed
a number of statutes to help defend itself against export tariffs on goods destined
for the North. 3 ' The statute questioned in M'Cready required members of the
124. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788 (1982) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
125. See, e.g., S.C at Crossroads, THE AUGUSTA CHRON. (Augusta, Ga.), Apr. 21,2000, at A4
(claiming that controversy over the confederate flag promotes the perception that "South Carolina is
the most backward state in the nation").
126. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 456 U.S. at 788 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that
one of "the most valuable aspects of our federalism ... [is] that the 50 states serve as laboratories for
the development of new social, economic, and political ideas").
127. JAMES LOWELL UNDERWOOD, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA VOLUME I: THE
RELATIONSHIP OF THE LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND JUDICIAL BRANCHES 7 (1986).
128. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 3.
129. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 8.
130. S.C. CONST., art. V, § 13.
131. UNDERWOOD, supra note 127, at 7-8.
132. Id. at 8.
133. Id. at 59.
134. J. Clifford Wallace, An Essay on Independence of the Judiciary: Independence from What
and Why, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. LAW 241, 246 (2001).
135. Roundtable Discussion, Is There a Threat to Judicial Independence in the United States
Today?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 7, 27 (1998) (comments of Judge Calabresi, Circuit Judge for the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals).
136. UNDERWOOD, supra note 127, at 39.
137. 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 1 (1834).
138. UNDERWOOD, supra note 127, at 38.
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South Carolina Militia to swear allegiance to the state rather than to the federal
government.'39 The South Carolina Court of Appeals overturned the law on the
grounds that it violated the United States Constitution." The General Assembly
viewed the court's decision as siding with the federal rather than the state




Unsurprisingly, when the General Assembly has shown its willingness to exert
this level of control over the court, the court's members will be reluctant to exercise
judgment contrary to legislative will.'42 However, the modem need for a court of
appeals to help relieve appellate backlog probably prevents the General Assembly
from repeating this retaliatory move. Yet the aftermath of M'Cready nonetheless
remains a symbol of the South Carolina General Assembly's power over the
judiciary.
With this history of involuntary deference to the legislative will in mind, South
Carolina's restrictive position on the separation of powers doctrine, as Simmons
articulated, is arguably a beneficial step toward eliminating this improbable, but
very real risk. Maintaining principles of freedom requires not only a division of
power, but also a balance between the divisions.'43 Simmons' impact on the overall
separation of powers while minimal, shifts the balance more in favor of the judiciary
and leaves the door open for a further shift in that direction. As this balance
between the judiciary and the General Assembly continues to equalize, the judiciary
will become more independent from outside influences the General Assembly may
have on it.
3. The Benefits of an Improved Balance in South Carolina
A strong judiciary, independent of influence from the General Assembly, yields
a number of benefits for state government as a whole. First, when a judiciary at
least appears independent, it lends credibility to the government's policies.14 A
common public complaint is that legislatures are beholden to the private interests
funding their campaigns. 145 An independent court is not seen as being so beholden.
Thus, as the independent judiciary validates laws, that validity, if perceived to be
independent, extends to the policies of the legislature and improves the public view
of the government.
Second, an independent judiciary is "important in those cases where courts are
called upon to resolve disputes between individuals and the state."" In South
Carolina, where the General Assembly selects the high court's judges, the
appearance that justices will side with the government that installed them is a real,
albeit poorly-founded, public concern. Decisions like Simmons, which not only rule
against the government, but also diminish the influence of the General Assembly,




143. KURLAND & LERNER, supra note 115, at 312.
144. See Matthew C. Stephenson, "When the Devil Turns... ": The Political Foundations of
Independent Judicial Review, 32 J. LEGAL STuD. 59, 62 (2003).
145. See Now Look Who's Hiding Special-Interest Donations, U.S.A. TODAY, Sept. 26, 2003,
at 12A (noting that South Carolina, among others, received a failing grade for its system of disclosure
of campaign finances).
146. Wallace, supra note 134, at 242.
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improve both the credibility and the perceived independence of South Carolina's
judiciary.
A final justification is the somewhat self-affirming presumption that the public
demands a judiciary that is independent from all outside influences.'47 "[P]ublic
acquiescence, if not approval, is crucial. To obtain credibility, the appearance and
the reality of impartiality must be preserved." 48 The obvious manifestation of this
notion is in the Model Code of Judicial Ethics: "A judge shall disqualify himself or
herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.""" While the primary focus of this rule is on financial and personal
influences,'5" its message is clear: Judges should avoid any appearance of
susceptibility to outside influence. Influence, of course, can come just as easily, if
not more easily, from an employer than from a family member or from having a
pecuniary interest in a party before the court. If the public perceives the General
Assembly as having influence over the judiciary, a reasonable citizen could
certainly conclude that a judge in any given instance may not be completely
impartial. By increasing independence from the General Assembly through careful
judicial expansion of doctrines such as separation of powers, the South Carolina
judiciary is slowly meeting the public's expectation of ajudiciary that operates free
from influence by the other branches of the government.
More difficulty arises in foreseeing a tangible benefit from the Simmons ruling,
which, aside from its apparent repercussions regarding the General Assembly's
ability to act retroactively, is simply a shift in South Carolina's concept of
separation of powers. However, some recent South Carolina cases indicate that a
small increase in the supreme court's power with respect to the General Assembly
may be sufficient to make a change.
As of the date of this writing, Abbeville v. South Carolina had just closed
arguments before the trial court.' Abbeville is a continuation case in which the
South Carolina Supreme Court found that the South Carolina Constitution required
the General Assembly to fund a "minimally adequate education" for each child in
the state. ' Currently, the plaintiffs' rural school districts are suing the state,
alleging that the General Assembly is not meeting this requirement. Regardless of
the outcome at trial, both parties intend to appeal.'
Assuming the case arrives at the South Carolina Supreme Court, the dissent to
the original Abbeville decision frames one of the barriers to a ruling for the school
districts. Justice Moore argued that, because the South Carolina Constitution does
not impose a standard on the General Assembly's funding of education, in doing so
the judiciary has violated separation of powers.' 54 This separation of powers
question will reappear if and when the South Carolina Supreme Court hears
Abbeville and determines whether the General Assembly is meeting the "minimally
adequate" requirement. The Supreme Court will then have to decide if the
147. Stephenson, supra note 144, at 63.
148. UNDERWOOD, supra note 127, at 79.
149. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(I) (2003).
150. See id.
151. Drew Jubera, School Funding Trial No Sprint; 11-Year S.C. Case, Dozens of Others Seen
as Sequel to Brown v. Board, AT. J.-CONST., Dec. 11, 2004, at IA.
152. Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 335 S.C. 58, 68, 515 S.E.2d 535, 540 (1999).
153. Jubera, supra note 151.
154. Abbeville County Sch. Dist., 335 S.C. at 70, 515 S.E.2d at 541 (Moore, J., dissenting); see
also Jennifer L. Fogle, Note, Abbeville County School District v. State: The Right to a Minimally
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separation of powers bars it from holding the General Assembly to a judicially-
created standard. However, with the court's apparent willingness to strengthen the
separation of powers doctrine, as Simmons shows, Justice Moore's concern may not
preclude a resolution in favor of the Abbeville school districts.
V. CONCLUSION
In Simmons v. Greenville Hospital, the South Carolina Supreme Court
reinforced its earlier holding that the doctrine of separation of powers bars the South
Carolina General Assembly from passing a statute that retroactively overrules a
supreme court decision. In many respects, this rule is an outlier when compared to
the separation of powers jurisprudence of both the federal government and many
other states. However, this restrictive rule, in the grand scheme of South Carolina
constitutional law, is beneficial to the state in two very significant ways. First, the
rule shows that South Carolina is willing to stand alone in its responsibility to act
as an incubator for new political ideas. Second, the rule shifts a modicum of power
from the General Assembly to the judiciary in a way that helps even the historically
unequal balance of power between the two branches. While the federal courts may
criticize South Carolina's rule, they have no power to change it, and Simmons will
be able to take its place in the long history of South Carolina jurisprudence as a
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